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LITTERING FOR $500:1 
HOW DOES JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL SOLVE THE 
PROBLEMS THAT FACTUALLY BASELESS 
PLEAS POSE TO THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
CLAUSE? 
INTRODUCTION 
The police arrest Leigh2 in St. Louis city for possessing less than thirty-
five grams of marijuana. The municipal prosecutor offers Leigh a plea deal: 
plead guilty to the misdemeanor violation of littering,3 and the prosecutor 
will drop the marijuana possession charge.4 Eager to end her legal battle and 
to be safe from the collateral consequences that can accompany a conviction 
for the possession of drugs,5 Leigh accepts the prosecutor’s plea deal and 
pleads guilty to the littering charge.  
As Leigh’s story demonstrates, it is impossible to understand the modern 
American criminal legal system without understanding plea bargaining.6 As 
many as 94 percent of state felony convictions and 97 percent of federal 
felony convictions result from guilty pleas.7 Therefore, any examination of 
 
1. SAINT LOUIS, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11.18.240(B) (2018) (“Any person, corporation 
or other legal entity which violates any of the provisions of this chapter or participates in the violations 
of its provisions, either as a proprietor, owner, tenant, manager, superintendent or otherwise, provided 
that the violations are not enforced under Chapter 25.33, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon the 
conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($5.00) [sic] and not 
more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment for not more than ninety (90) days or both 
such fine and imprisonment . . . .”). 
2. “Leigh” is a fictional character, and this story is not based on any one person’s experience. 
3. SAINT LOUIS, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11.18.020 (2018) (“No person shall throw, 
deposit, accumulate or cause or allow to be thrown, deposited or accumulated litter in or upon any 
sidewalk, parkway, gutter, street, alley or other public place within the City except in public receptacles 
or in authorized receptacles for collection.”).  
4. Id. § 11.60.300 (“It shall be unlawful for any person to possess marijuana . . . .”).  
5. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010) (declining to decide whether deportation 
consequences are truly “collateral” but discussing their impact on criminal defendants’ decision-
making); Nora V. Demleitner, “Collateral Damage”: No Re-Entry for Drug Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 
1027, 1034–41 (reviewing the collateral consequences that drug offenders face, including “denial of 
access to the social net,” denial of education and employment opportunities, and denial of access to 
political processes); Alicia Werning Truman, Unexpected Evictions: Why Drug Offenders Should Be 
Warned Others Could Lose Public Housing if They Plead Guilty, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1753, 1755, 1757–
61 (2004) (defining collateral consequences as the “civil penalties following a criminal conviction” and 
discussing loss of housing as a collateral consequence).  
6. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (“[Plea bargaining] is not some adjunct to the 
criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, 
Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992))). 
7. SEAN ROSENMERKEL, MATTHEW DUROSE & DONALD FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 
tbl.4.1 (2009); UNIV. AT ALBANY, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE: CRIMINAL 











the criminal legal system must confront the reality that “justice” does not 
play out in front of a jury of twelve peers; rather, it occurs in back rooms 
and hallways, out of the public eye and away from sunshine’s cleansing 
power.8  
One consequence of the modern plea-bargaining system is the 
emergence of “factually baseless pleas.”9 A factually baseless plea “is a 
guilty plea . . . entered by a defendant for an offense that the defendant did 
not commit, and that all the parties in the case know the defendant did not 
commit.”10 While there have been no statistical studies that examine the 
frequency of these factually baseless pleas, judges and lawyers within the 
criminal legal system acknowledge that they occur frequently.11 Many 
actors see these baseless pleas as a win-win-win situation—defendants get 
more lenient sentences, judges get reduced docket loads, and prosecutors 
get more time to spend on “serious” crimes.12 However, critics of these pleas 
argue that they promote unequal treatment of defendants, inaccurate results, 
and general discontent with the criminal legal system.13  
Additionally, factually baseless pleas may create other unexpected 
consequences for defendants. For example, when pleading guilty, Leigh 
assumes that it will be the last time that she will hear about the drug 
possession incident. However, one month later, a state prosecutor decides 
to charge Leigh with marijuana possession arising from the same incident. 
Leigh’s attorney assumes that since she has already been prosecuted for this 
crime she will be protected from this subsequent prosecution by the Double 
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and Waller v. Florida.14  
 
DEFENDANTS DISPOSED OF IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS tbl.5.24.2010 (2010), https://www.albany.edu/sou 
rcebook/pdf/t5242010.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NPE-YXTQ]. 
8. Michael P. Donnelly, From the Bench: End Factually Baseless Plea Bargains, LITIG., Spring 
2016, at 6, 6 (arguing that factually baseless plea bargains should not be accepted in Ohio because they 
undermine the search for truth and justice in the courts); see also Serial: You’ve Got Some Gauls, 
CHICAGO PUBLIC RADIO 30:24 (Sept. 20, 2018), https://serialpodcast.org/season-three/2/youve-got-
some-gauls [https://perma.cc/T9X7-PUBH] (mentioning Judge Michael Donnelly in Ohio, an anomaly 
in his courthouse, who does not discuss plea deals off the record).  
9. Mari Byrne, Note, Baseless Pleas: A Mockery of Justice, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2968 
(2010).  
10. Id. at 2966. 
11. Id. at 2964; see also Donnelly, supra note 8, at 7; St. Louis Criminal Defense FAQ, 
BRINKMAN & ALTER LLC, https://www.brinkmanandalter.com/st-louis-criminal-defense-faq.html [http 
s://perma.cc/6YVQ-HEN3] (“[Y]our attorney and the prosecutor come to an agreement to lower the 
marijuana possession charge to a lesser infraction, like ‘littering’ . . . .”). 
12. Byrne, supra note 9, at 2964. 
13. Myeonki Kim, Conviction Beyond a Reasonable Suspicion? The Need for Strengthening the 
Factual Basis Requirement in Guilty Pleas, 3 CONCORDIA L. REV. 102, 110–13 (2018). 
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”); Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 395 (1970) (holding that prosecution 
in a state court is barred by the Fifth Amendment if the person has been previously tried in a municipal 












If Leigh had been originally charged in state court, received a plea deal, 
and then been re-charged by another state prosecutor, she could potentially 
rely on the Supreme Court’s decision in Santobello v. New York for 
protection.15 In Santobello, the Court held that an agreement made with one 
prosecutor in an office operates to bind all of the prosecutors in the office 
because the “[t]he staff lawyers in a prosecutor’s office have the burden of 
‘letting the left hand know what the right hand is doing’ or has done.”16 
However, an agreement by the municipal prosecutors in Leigh’s case would 
not bind the state prosecutors because they are not on the “same hand” as 
the municipal prosecutors.17 It was not the state prosecutors who promised 
to dismiss her case, it was the municipal prosecutors. Therefore, the 
Supreme Court’s requirement that prosecutors follow through on their 
promises18 does not provide Leigh any relief or protection. 
Additionally, a closer examination of the Supreme Court’s Double 
Jeopardy jurisprudence, based on the decision in Blockburger v. United 
States,19 makes it unclear whether Leigh is protected from the subsequent 
prosecution by Waller and the Double Jeopardy Clause.20 This Note 
examines whether the Double Jeopardy Clause protects Leigh and other 
criminal defendants in similar situations—ultimately concluding that it does 
not. It also uses the Double Jeopardy Clause as a lens to examine how actors 
within the criminal legal system fail to consider the implications of factually 
baseless pleas when entering into these agreements. Finally, it proposes 
using the doctrine of judicial estoppel to protect criminal defendants from 
subsequent prosecutions arising out of factually baseless pleas.  
In Part I, this Note examines the American plea-bargaining system. An 
understanding of the current state of the American criminal legal system, 
specifically the explosion of plea bargains over the last century, is crucial to 
understanding the pervasiveness of factually baseless pleas within the 
system.  
In Part II, this Note defines factually baseless pleas and explores what 
constitutes factually baseless pleas. It will then quickly discuss the 
arguments that have been presented in support of, and in opposition to, the 
use of factually baseless pleas, before concluding with an examination of 
 
15. 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).  
16. Id.  
17. Id.  
18. Id.  
19. See infra Section III.B; see also Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2153 (2018) (referencing 
the Blockburger test as the Court’s current interpretation of whether two charged crimes are the “same 
offense”); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (holding that the proper test to 
determine whether a subsequent prosecution is barred because it is for the “same offense” is whether 
each crime charged requires proof of an element that the other does not). 
20. See infra Section IV.  











the impact that these pleas have on defendants and the criminal legal system 
as a whole. 
In Part III, this Note will analyze the Double Jeopardy Clause. While the 
jurisprudence is somewhat muddled, this Note attempts to unpack the 
current state of the Double Jeopardy Clause, specifically as it relates to 
subsequent prosecutions, which has often followed a formalistic set of rules.  
In Part IV, this Note discusses the intersection of factually baseless pleas 
and the Court’s double jeopardy jurisprudence. Specifically, it focuses on 
how and why factually baseless pleas fail to protect criminal defendants 
from subsequent prosecutions. The intersection of factually baseless pleas 
and the Double Jeopardy Clause highlights the significant jurisprudential 
issues that these baseless pleas create for the American criminal legal 
system.  
In Part V, this Note discusses judicial estoppel, and the application of 
judicial estoppel by the courts. Courts have interpreted this equitable 
doctrine differently in many jurisdictions, but this Note focuses on the 
guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court and the State of Missouri, as 
well as the doctrine’s application in criminal cases.  
Finally, in Part VI, this Note advocates for the use of judicial estoppel to 
protect criminal defendants from subsequent prosecutions after they accept 
a factually baseless plea. While the elimination of factually baseless pleas 
would be preferable to the “band-aid” solution that judicial estoppel 
presents, the lack of actors calling for the elimination of factually baseless 
pleas makes their abolition in the near future unlikely. In the meantime, 
judicial estoppel would prevent prosecutors from abusing factually baseless 
pleas, ensure that the courts do not expose defendants to multiple 
punishments for the same offense, and safeguard the integrity of the court 
system.  
I. PLEA BARGAINING: THIS IS AMERICA21 
Plea bargaining first became a systemic feature of the American criminal 
legal system in the early to mid-nineteenth century.22 While prosecutors had 
previously used plea bargains episodically,23 pleas grew in popularity over 
the nineteenth century, and by the early twentieth century they became the 
 
21. CHILDISH GAMBINO, THIS IS AMERICA (RCA Records 2018).  
22. MARY E. VOGEL, COERCION TO COMPROMISE: PLEA BARGAINING, THE COURTS, AND THE 
MAKING OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY 93 (2007).  
23. Id. (describing the infrequency of plea bargaining and pinning the number as low as 10 to 15 












defining feature of American justice.24 While it is commonly thought that 
the increase in plea bargains responded directly to rising caseload pressure, 
recent scholarship by Mary Vogel has challenged that assumption.25 Based 
on her research in Boston, Vogel contends that plea bargaining actually 
“preceded rather than followed the marked increase in caseload seen after 
1840.”26 Thus, she argues that plea bargaining was a form of social control 
used by the political elites to maintain their status.27 The plea bargaining 
process gave these political elites discretion over the criminal legal system 
while consolidating conflicts into one controllable system.28 
George Fisher’s research deepens the understanding of plea bargaining 
by focusing on the role of courtroom actors in developing and perpetuating 
plea bargains.29 Fisher focuses on how prosecutors, trial judges, and 
appellate judges expanded the use of plea bargains during the early 
twentieth century.30 These plea bargains seemingly protect the legitimacy 
of the legal system because they create a presumption that the accused 
committed the crime and protect juries from making incorrect decisions.31 
When a defendant accepts a plea bargain, there is no cross-examination to 
test the facts of the case,32 and the guilty plea is almost always accepted as 
conclusive and presumptively correct.33 Therefore, in theory and in the eyes 
of many judges, prosecutors, and the public, plea bargains promote the 
values of efficiency, efficacy, and predictability.34  
In part because of their perceived value to the judicial system, and 
possibly because of the prevalence of plea bargains by the mid-twentieth 
century, the Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the use of plea 
bargains.35 In fact, it would be almost impossible to remove plea bargains 
 
24. Id. at 95 (“According to complete counts of all cases in the Police Court docket made for this 
study, guilty pleas surged from less than 15 percent of all pleas entered in the docket in 1830 . . . . to a 
high of 88 percent in 1880.”).  
25. Id. at 123. 
26. Id.   
27. Id. at 131.  
28. Id.  
29. GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN 
AMERICA 177 (2003) (noting that plea bargains serve the interests of those in high places).  
30. Id. (describing how “expanding procedural protections” and the growth of appeals made plea 
bargains more useful for these actors). 
31. Id. at 178.  
32. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004) (finding that cross-examination 
helps ensure that evidence is reliable).  
33. FISHER, supra note 29, at 178.  
34. Id. 
35. Id.; see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (“The disposition of criminal 
charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes loosely called ‘plea 
bargaining,’ is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be 
encouraged.”); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970) (discussing the benefits of plea 
bargaining to the state and to the defendant).  











as a part of the American criminal legal system because they now define 
American criminal law.36 Their essential role in the modern American legal 
system is demonstrated by the fact that there have never been any procedural 
changes that have threatened to remove plea bargains from prominence.37 
However, despite their continued vitality, there are certainly many criminal 
defense attorneys who would argue against plea bargaining because it 
systemically favors prosecutors.38 
This systemic imbalance gives prosecutors enormous power to make 
arbitrary decisions whether to offer plea deals, when to offer plea deals, and 
the substance of those deals.39 “Even for misdemeanors, a prosecutor 
frequently has a variety of options at the charging stage of the process.”40 
Prosecutors often use these options to engage in “charge-bargaining,” which 
is a tactic used to control defendants and coerce them into pleading guilty 
in exchange for a lesser sentence or charge.41 A “charge-bargain” occurs 
when a prosecutor agrees to replace “a higher charge with a lower one in 
exchange for the defendant’s promise to plead guilty.”42 As part of the 
charge-bargaining process, prosecutors often engage in “charge-piling” and 
“charge-sliding,” which, respectively, allow prosecutors to pile on multiple 
charges in order to drastically increase the defendant’s potential sentence43 
and then replace one set of charges with another during negotiations to 
enhance their bargaining position.44  
 
36. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (“[Plea bargaining] is not some adjunct to the 
criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” (quoting Scott & Stuntz, supra note 6, at 
1912)).  
37. FISHER, supra note 29, at 202 (“[T]he most convincing proof [that plea bargaining has held 
evolutionary sway over its sibling criminal-justice institutions] may be our inability to name a single 
important procedural innovation of the last 150 years that threatened to choke off plea bargaining and 
yet flourished.”).  
38. Id. at 221. But see generally Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 OKLA. L. 
REV. 599 (2005) (defending plea bargaining and discussing the benefits created by plea bargaining, 
including efficiency and autonomy).  
39. ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 46 
(2007). 
40. Id. at 24 (describing the discretionary power that the prosecutor has in misdemeanor cases, 
including decisions about whether to bring charges and what sentence to seek).  
41. Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303, 
1309, 1311 (2018) (describing how prosecutors have free rein to inflate charges and obtain more 
convictions through coercive plea bargaining—a process that has been “analogized to torture”).  
42. Id. at 1311. “The ability to control a defendant’s sentencing exposure by manipulating the 
charges against him—that is to say, the ability to charge bargain—is widely recognized by scholars as 
‘the core of prosecutorial power in the United States.’” Id. at 1310 (quoting David Alan Sklansky, The 
Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473, 487 (2016)).  
43. Id. at 1313.  












Theoretically, prosecutors’ ability to charge-bargain is limited by ethical 
standards,45 rules of criminal procedure,46 and the trial judge’s willingness 
to accept a plea of guilty.47 However, these structures often do little to 
actually limit prosecutors, especially given most defendants’ personal 
interests in efficiency and minimizing inherent risks involved with going to 
trial.48 This system, full of prosecutorial discretion, overcrowded dockets, 
and individually-focused defendants, creates a criminal legal system that is 
ripe for abuse.49 Enter, stage right, factually baseless pleas.  
II. FACTUALLY BASELESS PLEAS 
Factually baseless pleas are “‘admission[s] of guilt for the purposes of 
the case,’ entered by a defendant for an offense that the defendant did not 
commit, and that all parties in the case know the defendant did not 
commit.”50 These are not the same as Alford pleas, fictional pleas, or pleas 
to lesser-included crimes.51 And, compared with these other types of pleas, 
factually baseless pleas have remained relatively unstudied. However, 
anecdotal evidence from judges shows that these pleas may be quite 
common in the criminal legal system.52 
Examinations of factually baseless pleas most often occur at the traffic 
court level,53 but these pleas also occur in municipal courts and state 
courts.54 While factually baseless pleas are certainly no secret,55 many actors 
do not like discussing these pleas because they undermine both the 
 
45. See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14-3.1 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 3d ed. 1999); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  
46. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3); MO. SUP. CT. R. 24.02(e); see also Crespo, supra note 
41, at 1306 (“[I]t is this subconstitutional state law of criminal procedure—the hidden law of plea 
bargaining—that time and again establishes the mechanisms and legal frameworks through which 
prosecutorial plea bargaining power is generated and deployed.”). 
47. See e.g., Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 368 (Iowa 
2005) (limiting the ability of prosecutors to comply with ethical standards while engaging in factually 
baseless plea bargaining). 
48. Crespo, supra note 41, at 1303.  
49. Id.  
50. Byrne, supra note 9, at 2966 (footnote omitted) (quoting Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 
451, 455 (1926)).  
51. Id. at 2967. Alford pleas are pleas “coupled with claims of innocence.” Id.; see North Carolina 
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38–39 (1970). Fictional pleas occur when a defendant pleads guilty to a crime 
that does not actually exist. Byrne, supra note 9, at 2967. Pleas to lesser-included crimes include pleas 
to offenses “necessarily included in the offense charged.” Id. (quoting Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 
131, 134 n.4 (1956)). These types of pleas all raise their own issues for criminal defendants and the 
criminal legal system, but their regulation and use are beyond the scope of this Note.  
52. Donnelly, supra note 8, at 7 (citing an informal study that the author conducted which 
revealed “hundreds of rape cases that were resolved” by factually baseless pleas).  
53. See Byrne, supra note 9, at 2968 n.40. 
54. Donnelly, supra note 8, at 7; see also Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 
706 N.W.2d 360, 367 (Iowa 2005) (condemning factually baseless pleas in Iowa).  
55. See St. Louis Criminal Defense FAQ, supra note 11. 











legitimacy of the judicial system and the assumption that our criminal legal 
system finds truth.56 
Some jurisdictions prohibit factually baseless pleas.57 For example, the 
Iowa Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor who accepts factually 
unsupported guilty pleas violates the Iowa ethics code.58 The court 
specifically notes that any prosecutor who accepts guilty pleas to factually 
baseless crimes is not fulfilling their duty to only bring charges for which 
they have probable cause.59 This decision condemns the acceptance of 
factually baseless pleas and exposes Iowa prosecutors to potential sanctions 
if they choose to accept these pleas.60 However, Iowa’s decision to harshly 
condemn factually baseless pleas, and to sanction the prosecutors who 
engage in charge-bargaining using factually baseless pleas, while 
commendable, is not the norm in every jurisdiction.61  
In jurisdictions that do allow factually baseless pleas, they may have 
gained prominence because, especially in municipal courts, many 
prosecutors face excessive caseloads, often consisting of up to hundreds of 
felonies and misdemeanors per year.62 Because of these prosecutors’ high 
caseloads, it may not always be worth the expenditure of resources to bring 
all cases to trial.63 Therefore, prosecutors use plea bargains to ensure that 
they can still obtain convictions without neglecting the rest of their 
caseload.64 In many cases, the prosecutor can negotiate using lesser-
included offenses that are still based in fact; however, in many misdemeanor 
and infraction cases, there are no lesser-included crimes.65 Thus, 
prosecutors who wish to engage in charge bargaining may feel that they 
have no choice but to present a defendant with factually baseless plea 
offers.66 In the short term these deals can benefit defendants because they 
may receive a lenient sentence, have a lesser crime on their record, or return 
 
56. Byrne, supra note 9, at 2997. 
57. See, e.g., Howe, 706 N.W.2d at 367.  
58. Id. at 368.  
59. Id. at 369.  
60. Id. at 378.  
61. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 9, at 2968 (discussing the use of factually baseless pleas in 
Missouri municipal courts).  
62. Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, Essay, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive 
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 268–70 (2011).  
63. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 39, at 22 (“The ever-present desire to dispose of the constantly 
growing number of criminal cases as expeditiously as possible undoubtedly played a part [in the decision 
to dismiss a murder charge].”).  
64. VOGEL, supra note 22, at 9.  
65. See, e.g., SAINT LOUIS, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11.61.020 (2018) (drug paraphernalia 
possession); SAINT LOUIS, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11.60.300 (2018) (marijuana possession).  
66. Byrne, supra note 9, at 2972 (“Especially where prosecutors have overwhelming numbers of 
similarly situated, seemingly minor cases, baseless pleas provide a quick and efficient resolution, 












to their families.67 Additionally, while at least some of these defendants are 
innocent, they still agree to the bargain because it minimizes their long-term 
risk.68 Prosecutors engaged in factually baseless plea bargaining may even 
feel that they are helping criminal defendants by giving them second 
chances.69  
However, while factually baseless pleas may seem like a compromise 
between prosecutors and defendants that balances prosecutors’ interest in 
efficiency with defendants’ interest in leniency, factually baseless pleas 
present significant dangers to the criminal legal system. First, they 
undermine the legitimacy of the criminal legal system because they 
necessarily involve disregarding the truth; by definition they can only occur 
when a defendant pleads guilty to something they did not do.70 Second, they 
potentially raise separation of powers issues because the courts implicitly 
define crimes to include conduct that the legislature did not intend them to 
include.71 Third, these pleas also potentially result in more guilty pleas for 
innocent defendants, which becomes especially apparent in “standard-deal” 
cases72 because there is very little investigation.73 Finally, these pleas can 
undermine the criminal legal system because many legal doctrines, 
including the Double Jeopardy Clause, do not conceive of pleas which are 
not based in fact, and the jurisprudence is not, therefore, prepared to handle 
factually baseless pleas. 
 
67. DAVIS, supra note 39, at 50–52 (describing the story of Emma Faye Stewart who was 
arrested, could not afford bond, and pleaded guilty to a crime that she did not commit so that she could 
return to her family). 
68. Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 
TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1239 (2008) (“Innocent defendants plead guilty, as do guilty defendants, because 
the alternative—contesting guilt at trial—is too risky.”).  
69. Byrne, supra note 9, at 2990–91 (referencing a New Jersey prosecutor who, when asked 
about factually baseless pleas said, “[Y]ou’re not there just to hammer someone, you’re there to do 
justice, and sometimes justice means people should get a break” (alteration in original) (quoting Jennifer 
V. Hughes & Dan Kraut, A Bargain That Can't Be Driven Anymore: Judges Apply Brakes to No-Point 
Tickets, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Apr. 30, 2000, at A1)). 
70. Id. at 2966. 
71. Id. at 2995 n.296; cf. People v. Stephenson, 30 P.3d 715 (Colo. App. 2000) (finding that 
courts could not accept pleas to non-existent crimes because “the power to define crimes and prescribe 
punishments is vested exclusively in the General Assembly”). 
72. Id. at 2968 n.40. (“[P]rosecutors’ offices typically have ‘standard deals’ that ‘may be 
contained in written guidelines formulated by those in charge of the prosecutor’s office or based on 
unwritten practices developed over time and passed on to newer members of the office.’” (quoting 
Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 
CLINICAL L. REV. 73, 105 n.119 (1995))); see, e.g., St. Louis Criminal Defense FAQ, supra note 11. 
73. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 17 (2018) (“Numerous scholars 
have examined the innocence problem of plea bargaining and have estimated that anywhere from 1.6% 
to 27% of defendants who plead guilty may be factually innocent.”); see also Covey, supra note 68, at 
1239 (“Nobody knows how many innocent defendants enter guilty pleas, but the number almost certainly 
is larger than has previously been acknowledged.”).  











III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
The Fifth Amendment states that no person shall “for the same 
offense . . . be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”74 The Supreme Court 
has interpreted this phrase in many ways over the years and the contours of 
double jeopardy protection are still not entirely clear.75 Part III.A will 
discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Part 
III.B will explore the Supreme Court’s current double jeopardy 
jurisprudence and how the Court has recently embraced a formalistic 
approach to the Double Jeopardy Clause. Part III.C will then examine the 
Supreme Court’s decision to treat municipalities and states as the same 
sovereigns for the purpose of double jeopardy.  
A. The Theory of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
Perhaps the most oft-quoted rationale for the Double Jeopardy Clause 
was stated by Justice Black in Green v. United States.76 Justice Black 
explained:  
[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to 
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged 
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and 
ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and 
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though 
innocent he may be found guilty.77 
Justice Black focused on avoiding harassment and undue embarrassment for 
defendants as the underlying rationales for the Double Jeopardy Clause.78  
Other commentators have advanced somewhat different rationales for 
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Some commentators believe that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause is not designed to protect against harassment, but rather 
multiple consequences for the same offense.79 One commentator has gone 
so far as to say that it is merely “an outgrowth of substantive criminal law 
and the procedural allocation of responsibility between legislatures and 
judges.”80 Under this rationale, the Double Jeopardy Clause preserves the 
 
74. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
75. GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW 1 (1998). 
76. 355 U.S. 184 (1957). 
77. Id. at 187–88.  
78. Id.; see THOMAS, supra note 75, at 50 (“The standard interpretation focuses on the harm of 
forcing a defendant to endure a second trial, a harm the Court refers to as ‘harassment.’”). 
79. THOMAS, supra note 75, at 56 (discussing Eli Richardson’s theory that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause does not protect against harassment, but rather, multiple punishments for the same offense).  












legislature’s right to define crimes.81 But at their core, regardless of how 
they frame the exact rationale, all of these theories focus on ensuring that 
criminal defendants are not punished twice for the same crime.82 However, 
finding a framework that effectuates that protection has proven challenging 
for the Court.83  
B. The Supreme Court’s Current Double Jeopardy Jurisprudence: The 
Formalistic Approach 
Today, the Supreme Court applies the Blockburger test to determine 
whether a subsequent prosecution for the same or a similar offense is barred 
by the Double Jeopardy Clause.84 Clearly, the Double Jeopardy Clause 
protects against a subsequent prosecution of a defendant after a prior finding 
of guilt or innocence for the same charge.85 Additionally, the Court has 
extended protections to subsequent prosecutions after a conviction or 
acquittal for a lesser- or greater-included offense.86 The Supreme Court has 
also made it clear that defendants are protected from subsequent 
prosecutions when they have taken a guilty plea and the punishment has 
been enforced.87 However, the Court has never considered whether an 
individual is protected if they accept a factually baseless plea, or even how 
the Court would approach a case that involves a factually baseless plea. 
The Court’s current understanding of the Double Jeopardy Clause did 
not arise out of a vacuum; rather, the Court grappled with the Double 
Jeopardy Clause for years before settling on Blockburger as the test to 
determine whether a subsequent prosecution for a similar or the same 
offense is prohibited.88 The Court has consistently struggled to define “same 
 
81. Id. at 68.  
82. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).  
83. THOMAS, supra note 75, at 1 (“The United States Supreme Court has failed to achieve a stable 
interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”).  
84. Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2153 (2018); see Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 
299, 304 (1932). 
85. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. 
86. Guide for Users: II. Preliminary Proceedings, 46 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 269, 542 
(2017); see Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) (finding a subsequent prosecution barred).  
87. Brown, 432 U.S. at 165. But see Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 502 (1984) (prohibiting 
offensive use of guilty plea to invoke double jeopardy, such as taking a guilty plea to a lesser-included 
crime while charges on the greater offense are pending in order to avoid criminal liability). 
88. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993) (settling on the Blockburger test as the 
standard evaluation of whether two offenses are the “same offence” for the purpose of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause).  











offence” and Blockburger89 is the Court’s attempt to provide a consistent, 
usable standard.90 
The Court in Blockburger held that “where the same act or transaction 
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be 
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether 
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”91 When 
courts conduct a Blockburger analysis, they are supposed to look at the 
statutory elements of the crime and determine whether one of the charged 
offenses contains an element that is not present in the other charged 
offense.92  
In Blockburger, the petitioner was charged with five counts of violating 
the Harrison Narcotic Act.93 Petitioner was found guilty on three of the 
counts, including a violation of Section One of the Act and Section Two of 
the Act. 94 Section One of the Harrison Act made it illegal to sell opium or 
other narcotics if they were not in an appropriately stamped package.95 
Section Two of the Act made it illegal to sell the drug without a written 
order from the buyer.96 The petitioner claimed that a prosecution under both 
Section One and Section Two of the Act put him in jeopardy twice for the 
same offense.97 The Supreme Court held that even though only one act had 
occurred, the petitioner had violated two statutes that contained different 
elements; therefore, the prosecution of both offenses did not violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.98 
In Grady v. Corbin, the Supreme Court determined that Blockburger was 
not the only test that should be used to determine whether something was 
the “same offense” for the purposes of double jeopardy.99 In Grady, the 
 
89. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 299. 
90. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704 (discussing the Blockburger test and referencing its “deep historical 
roots”).  
91. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 (citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)). 
92. Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2153 (2018) (applying the Blockburger test to decide a 
Double Jeopardy Clause issue).  
93. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 300; see Harrison Narcotic Act, ch. 1, § 1, 38 Stat. 785 
(1914), amended by Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 1006, 40 Stat. 1057, 1131 (1919) (“It shall be 
unlawful for any person to purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute any of the aforesaid drugs [opium and 
other narcotics] except in the original stamped package or from the original stamped package; and the 
absence of appropriate tax-paid stamps from any of the aforesaid drugs shall be prima facie evidence of 
a violation of this section by the person in whose possession same may be found . . . .”); Harrison 
Narcotic Act, ch. 1, § 2, 38 Stat. 785, 786 (1914) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, barter, 
exchange, or give away any of the drugs specified in section 691 of this title, except in pursuance of a 
written order of the person to whom such article is sold, bartered, exchanged, or given, on a form to be 
issued in blank for that purpose by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.”).  
94. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301. 
95. Id. at 300 & n.1; see Harrison Narcotic Act § 1.  
96. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 300 & n.2; see Harrison Narcotic Act § 2.  
97. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 301. 
98. Id. at 304.  












Court held that even subsequent prosecutions that were allowed under 
Blockburger could be barred if the prosecution would have to prove 
“conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already 
been prosecuted.”100 However, just three years later in United States v. 
Dixon, the Court explicitly overruled its decision in Grady and held that 
Blockburger was the proper test to determine whether multiple prosecutions 
were for the same “offense.”101 In Dixon, the Court held that “[t]he ‘same-
conduct’ rule [Grady] announced is wholly inconsistent with earlier 
Supreme Court precedent and with the clear common-law understanding of 
double jeopardy.”102 While the subsequent prosecutions in Dixon would 
clearly have been barred by Grady,103 the Court held that the Grady standard 
was unworkable and ruled that under Blockburger, the subsequent 
prosecution was not barred.104 
At the moment, the current Court seems content to continue to apply 
Blockburger.105 While Grady “probably achieves a fairer result in some 
cases,” the Court rejected the Grady approach in favor of the more clear-cut 
Blockburger analysis.106  
C. Municipalities and the State Are the “Same Sovereign” 
In Waller v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that both a municipal court 
and a state court are arms of the same sovereign, and, therefore, a guilty plea 
in a municipal court bars further prosecution by the state for the “same 
offense.”107 The Court analogized the situation of state and municipal 
governments to that of the United States and its territories.108 Because 
municipalities and state governments derive their power from the same 
source, they must be treated as one entity for the purposes of double 
jeopardy.109 Therefore, when someone like Leigh pleads guilty to a crime in 
municipal court, he or she is protected from a subsequent prosecution for 
that “same offense,”110 even though the subsequent prosecution occurs in 
state court and not municipal court.111 However, even though Leigh would 
 
100. Id.  
101. 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993).  
102. Id.  
103. Id. at 703.  
104. Id.  
105. Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2153 (2018).  
106. THOMAS, supra note 75, at 144.  
107. 397 U.S. 387, 393 (1970).  
108. Id.; see Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2016) (reasoning that, in the 
same way that a territory derives its power from the federal government, a municipality originally 
derives its authority and power from the state, so it must be treated as one sovereign with the state). 
109. Waller, 397 U.S. at 394.  
110. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).  
111. Waller, 397 U.S. at 394. 











normally be entitled to the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the 
discussion in Part IV demonstrates that the fact that she accepted a factually 
baseless plea deprives her of that protection.112 
IV. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE AND FACTUALLY BASELESS PLEAS 
The fundamental fairness considerations underlying the Double 
Jeopardy Clause seem to suggest that Leigh should not be subject to 
prosecution for the same acts that led to the littering plea.113 If the state is 
allowed to continue prosecuting Leigh for her actions, even after the 
municipal court has meted out punishment, Leigh, and others in the same 
situation, will be forced to live “in a continuing state of anxiety and 
insecurity.”114 There is also a very real danger that Leigh will be punished 
twice for one act.115 Additionally, this second prosecution overrides the 
legislative intent for criminal defendants to only be punished once for their 
crimes.116 Clearly, no matter what rationale is used to justify the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, Leigh should be protected by the doctrine.  
However, after an examination of the mechanics of factually baseless 
pleas and the Double Jeopardy Clause, it seems apparent that the Double 
Jeopardy Clause would not protect Leigh from a subsequent prosecution in 
state court stemming from her marijuana possession charge. In St. Louis, 
littering requires proof that a person “throw, deposit, accumulate or cause 
or allow to be thrown, deposited or accumulated litter in or upon any 
sidewalk, parkway, gutter, street, alley or other public place within the City 
except in public receptacles or in authorized receptacles for collection.”117 
Marijuana possession requires proof that “a person, with the knowledge of 
the presence and nature of [the marijuana], has actual or constructive 
possession of the [marijuana].”118 Under the Court’s Blockburger analysis, 
these offenses clearly require proof that the other does not.119 Therefore, 
even though Leigh expected her case to be finalized when she accepted the 
municipal prosecutor’s plea deal, and even though fairness would seem to 
 
112. See infra Section IV.  
113. See supra Section III.A.  
114. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
115. See THOMAS, supra note 75, at 112. 
116. Id. 
117. SAINT LOUIS, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11.18.020 (2018). 
118. MO. REV. STAT. § 195.010(38) (2018) (defining “possessed” or “possessing a controlled 
substance”); see also SAINT LOUIS, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11.60.300 (2018) (“It shall be 
unlawful for any person to possess marijuana as defined in Chapter 195.010 et seq. of the Revised 
Statutes of Missouri as amended.”); MO. REV. STAT. § 195.010(28) (defining marijuana).  
119. None of the elements of either crime overlap, so any analysis that a court would undertake 
under Blockburger would quickly and easily conclude that these offenses are not the “same.” See 












dictate that she not face a subsequent prosecution for the same act, the 
Court’s current double jeopardy analysis would not protect Leigh.  
Even under a Grady analysis, Leigh would be unlikely to receive 
protection. Under Grady, the court would look to see whether the 
prosecution would have to prove facts alleged in the first offense to obtain 
the second prosecution.120 In this case, the prosecutor in the second 
proceeding would not have to prove any facts relating to littering in order 
to convict Leigh of drug possession.121 Leigh could attempt to argue that the 
underlying facts of the littering offense, that she allegedly possessed 
marijuana, would have to be re-proven in the subsequent case, and, 
therefore, she should be protected from subsequent prosecution. However, 
this overlooks the Court’s ruling that “[t]he critical inquiry is what conduct 
the State will prove, not the evidence the State will use to prove that 
conduct.”122 Therefore, because the elements of littering do not overlap with 
the elements of marijuana possession, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not 
seem to protect Leigh.123  
Unfortunately, despite the fundamental unfairness of prosecuting Leigh 
twice for the same crime, none of the Court’s double jeopardy decisions 
protect Leigh from subsequent prosecutions after she accepts the factually 
baseless plea in municipal court. This lack of protection illustrates the 
shortcomings of the current interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, 
and, perhaps even more so, the danger that factually baseless pleas pose to 
defendants and to the legitimacy of the criminal legal system. These pleas 
complicate current legal doctrine, often at the expense of the rights of 
criminal defendants. Therefore, unless or until jurisdictions eliminate the 
use of factually baseless pleas, the courts need to consider alternative 
avenues to protect criminal defendants who accept these pleas from 
subsequent prosecutions. The equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel 
provides just such an avenue.  
V. JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL 
In New Hampshire v. Maine, the Supreme Court of the United States 
recognized the doctrine of judicial estoppel.124 Judicial estoppel “generally 
prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and 
then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.”125 
 
120. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 (1990); see supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.  
121. See SAINT LOUIS, MO., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11.18.020 (littering); SAINT LOUIS, MO., 
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11.60.300 (marijuana possession). 
122. Grady, 495 U.S. at 521.  
123. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. 
124. 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001). 
125. Id. at 749 (quoting Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227 n.8 (2000)). 











This doctrine is designed “‘to protect the integrity of the judicial process’. . . 
by ‘prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to 
the exigencies of the moment.’”126  
While the Supreme Court refused to elucidate discrete standards to 
govern judicial estoppel in New Hampshire v. Maine, it highlighted three 
factors that are relevant to a court’s considerations of whether or not to apply 
the doctrine:127  
First, a party’s later position must be “clearly inconsistent” with its 
earlier position. . . . Second, courts regularly inquire whether the party 
has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier 
position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a 
later proceeding would create “the perception that either the first or 
the second court was misled” . . . . A third consideration is whether 
the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an 
unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party 
if not estopped.128 
Because judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, different jurisdictions 
have adopted different applications of the doctrine.129 Although the federal 
courts do offer some guidance, the Missouri courts’ application of the 
doctrine best determines whether judicial estoppel would protect Leigh 
from subsequent prosecution in this case.130  
In Missouri, the doctrine of judicial estoppel exists “to prevent parties 
from playing fast and loose with the court.”131 If parties could “take 
inconsistent positions at their whim, it would allow chaotic and 
unpredictable results in our court system, which of course would be 
problematic for a host of reasons.”132 To determine whether a party is 
playing fast and loose with the court, the Missouri courts apply the factors 
that the Supreme Court announced in New Hampshire v. Maine.133 While 
the Missouri courts note that these are not “fixed or inflexible prerequisites,” 
 
126. Id. at 749–50 (citations omitted) (first quoting Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 
598 (6th Cir. 1982); and then quoting United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
127. Id. at 750–51.  
128. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Edwards, 690 F.2d at 599). 
129. Nicole C. Frazer, Note, Reassessing the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel: The Implications of 
the Judicial Integrity Rationale, 101 VA. L. REV. 1501, 1513 (2015).  
130. Missouri is a useful example of how states apply judicial estoppel; however, any analysis of 
cases similar to Leigh’s case will need to consider that the rules on judicial estoppel may be very different 
in other states and jurisdictions.  
131. Brooks v. Fletcher, 337 S.W.3d 137, 143 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting State ex rel. KelCor, 
Inc. v. Nooney Realty Trust, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)).  
132. Id. at 144.  












they predominantly analyze judicial estoppel issues using these factors.134 
Additionally, in Missouri, there is no requirement that the inconsistent 
positions be taken in the same, or even related, proceedings.135 Finally, there 
is no requirement that the position be taken under oath, although whether a 
statement is under oath may factor into a court’s decision on whether to 
apply the doctrine.136  
While no Missouri courts have applied judicial estoppel to criminal 
proceedings, there is ample authority from jurisdictions around the country 
that judicial estoppel should apply in criminal matters.137 Most jurisdictions 
that apply judicial estoppel to criminal matters note that the doctrine is 
intended to achieve fair and just results.138 Therefore, many courts have used 
the same New Hampshire factors that govern in civil cases in criminal 
cases139 because applying the doctrine is “designed to preserve the dignity 
of the courts and insure order in judicial proceedings,”140 and parties that 
take inconsistent positions can undermine the dignity and order of the courts 
in both civil and criminal cases.141  
VI. PROPOSAL: APPLYING JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL TO SUBSEQUENT 
PROSECUTIONS ARISING FROM FACTUALLY BASELESS PLEAS 
Applying judicial estoppel to block subsequent prosecutions in state 
court after a defendant accepts a factually baseless plea in municipal court 
ensures that prosecutors “cannot have [their] cake and eat it too.”142 An 
equitable doctrine is a sensible solution to this loophole in the Double 
Jeopardy Clause because judicial estoppel is flexible and not bound by the 
same rigid rules as the double jeopardy doctrine.143 However, in Missouri 
 
134. Id.; see, e.g., Vinson v. Vinson, 243 S.W.3d 418, 422 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (applying the New 
Hampshire factors and determining that once the court finds that positions are not clearly inconsistent 
there is no need to consider the other factors), overruled in part by Vacca v. Mo. Dep’t of Labor & Indus. 
Relations, 575 S.W.3d 223 (Mo. 2019); Child Support Enf’t v. North, 444 S.W.3d 905, 909 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2014) (applying all of the New Hampshire factors and determining that the court must judicially 
estop a party from proceeding if they made unambiguous statements which are clearly inconsistent with 
a later position).  
135. Id. at 145–46.  
136. Id. at 145.  
137. See, e.g., Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Judicial Estoppel in Criminal Prosecution, 121 
A.L.R.5th 551 (2018) (collecting cases from around the country that apply judicial estoppel to criminal 
cases).  
138. Id. § 2[a].  
139. Id.  
140. Jeffries v. Jeffries, 840 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Edwards v. Durham, 
346 S.W.2d 90, 101 (Mo. 1961)).  
141. See Brooks v. Fletcher, 337 S.W.3d 137, 143 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (civil case); People v. 
Gross, 465 N.E.2d 119, 122 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (criminal case).  
142. Frazer, supra note 129, at 1543 (quoting Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 
1146, 1177 (D.S.C. 1974)).  
143. See supra Section III.B.  











and many other states, there are still some requirements that a defendant 
must meet in order to gain the protection of the doctrine.144 Leigh, and other 
criminal defendants in similar situations, should be able to meet all of the 
requirements for the application of judicial estoppel, and garner the 
protection of the doctrine. 
A. Municipal Prosecutors and State Prosecutors Are the “Same Party” 
for Purposes of Judicial Estoppel 
While not necessarily on the “same hand,”145 municipal prosecutors and 
state prosecutors should be the same party for purposes of judicial estoppel. 
In Waller, the Supreme Court held that municipal and state courts both draw 
their power from the same sovereign, and, therefore, should be treated as 
one unit for the purposes of double jeopardy.146 In the same way, 
prosecutors for both of these entities should be treated as one party because 
both municipal prosecutors and state prosecutors draw their power to 
prosecute from the same source.147  
Perhaps the best analogy for this situation is a well. When municipal 
prosecutors make an agreement, they are drawing water from the same well 
that state prosecutors use when making agreements.148 Once a municipal 
prosecutor has taken water out of the well, the state prosecutor cannot dip a 
bucket in and take out that same water because it is already gone. In the 
same way, when a municipal prosecutor charge-bargains with a defendant, 
the state prosecutor cannot turn around and try to make the same bargain at 
a later date. 
Applying judicial estoppel in this manner would not unfairly constrain 
municipal and state prosecutors because the doctrine would be limited to a 
very particular subset of cases. Normally, a state prosecutor would be 
prohibited from “double dipping” into the well by the doctrine of double 
jeopardy.149 Therefore, state and municipal prosecutors who know that they 
may be pursuing the same charges against a defendant will, or at least 
should, already be communicating about their decisions.150 Therefore, a 
holding that municipal and state prosecutors are the same party for the 
purposes of judicial estoppel would not operate to impose significant new 
 
144. See supra Section V.  
145. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).  
146. Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 393 (1970). 
147. Id.  
148. Id. at 395 (noting that a municipality and a state both derive their power to prosecute from 
the same source).  
149. See supra Section III.  
150. See Waller, 397 U.S. at 396 (holding that a municipality and a state are the same sovereign 
for purposes of double jeopardy and thus prohibiting one from prosecuting a defendant if the other one 












burdens on prosecutors. Rather, it would reinforce existing responsibilities 
and close a loophole that unfairly prejudices criminal defendants and 
undermines the legitimacy of the courts.  
B. Agreeing to Dismiss a Charge and Later Re-Charging a Defendant Is a 
Clearly Inconsistent Position 
When a municipal prosecutor agrees to dismiss a charge, and a state 
prosecutor later re-charges a defendant for that crime, the prosecutors have 
taken clearly inconsistent positions. The act of dismissing a charge on its 
own may not be enough to establish a position, but any agreement that a 
prosecutor makes with a defendant agreeing to dismiss the charge is a 
position.151 The fact that these would be two different prosecutions of the 
defendant makes no difference for purposes of judicial estoppel.152 When a 
party accepts a plea agreement, he or she expects the other party to respect 
and abide by the terms of the plea agreement.153 Failing to abide by an 
agreement to dismiss criminal charges is clearly inconsistent with the plea 
agreement and undermines the public’s trust in the integrity of prosecutors 
and the courts.154 
C. A Court’s Acceptance of a Plea Agreement Constitutes the Successful 
Maintenance of a Prosecutor’s Position 
When a prosecutor charge-bargains or charge-slides, the goal is to reach 
a conclusion in the case.155 Therefore, when a judge agrees to accept that 
plea agreement, the prosecutor has obtained their desired benefit—a guilty 
plea.156 When a party obtains the benefits that it desires from its position, it 
has “successfully maintained” its position.157 Therefore, unless judicial 
estoppel operates to bind the prosecutors to their earlier position of 
dismissing the charges, the prosecutors could undermine the integrity of the 
judicial process and reap its benefits.158 
 
151. See Brooks v. Fletcher, 337 S.W.3d 137, 145 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (“[E]ven when the prior 
statements were not made under oath, the doctrine may be invoked to prevent a party from playing ‘fast 
and loose with the courts.’” (quoting State ex rel. KelCor, Inc. v. Nooney Realty Trust, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 
399, 403 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998))).  
152. Id. at 146.  
153. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).  
154. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2001). 
155. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.  
156. Cf. Brooks, 337 S.W.3d at 144 (finding a successfully maintained position when a party 
obtained benefits from its previously asserted position). 
157. Id.  
158. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 749–50.  











D. Prosecutors Derive an Unfair Advantage from This Loophole in the 
Double Jeopardy Jurisprudence 
Prosecutors who exploit this loophole in the double jeopardy 
jurisprudence are unfairly advantaging themselves and unfairly punishing 
criminal defendants. If prosecutors are actively using this loophole to 
guarantee plea agreements in municipal courts before pursuing stiffer 
punishments in state court, they are acting in bad faith and gaining an unfair 
advantage.159 Unaware criminal defendants, such as Leigh, could find 
themselves punished twice for the same actions and placed at the mercy of 
prosecutors who already hold many of the bargaining chips.160 However, 
even if prosecutors do not intentionally abuse this loophole, criminal 
defendants are still unfairly punished.161 A criminal defendant caught in this 
unenviable situation will be subject to double punishment for one set of 
actions, regardless of the good or bad faith of the prosecutors involved.162  
The “unfairness” requirement163 bars the prosecution from using a 
judicial estoppel argument to prohibit a criminal defendant from claiming 
that a previous plea was baseless. An enterprising prosecutor could argue 
that, because a defendant admitted to committing the factually baseless 
crime in a plea colloquy, a defendant cannot now argue that the plea was 
factually baseless. This argument fails because a defendant is not “unfairly” 
claiming that the plea was factually baseless.164 The defendant is simply 
trying to protect themselves from subsequent prosecutions. If a defendant 
had instead pleaded guilty to a factually based lesser-included crime, they 
would already be protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause.165 This use of 
judicial estoppel merely closes a loophole in the double jeopardy 
doctrine.166  
The “unfairness” requirement, and the balancing of the equities, enables 
judicial estoppel to fix this loophole in the Double Jeopardy Clause.167 This 
doctrine is flexible, and it can be applied in a limited case-by-case 
 
159. See id. at 755 (balancing the equities when applying judicial estoppel and finding that a 
party’s assertion of two inconsistent positions would undermine “the integrity of the judicial process”).  
160. See supra Section I.  
161. Child Support Enf’t v. North, 444 S.W.3d 905, 910 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (recognizing that 
when one party obtains an unfair benefit, the other party is left with an unfair disadvantage).  
162. See supra Section IV.  
163. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751 (discussing the third factor in the judicial estoppel doctrine, 
which looks at whether the party has derived an “unfair” advantage).  
164. See, e.g., North, 444 S.W.3d at 910 (finding that a father received an unfair benefit over a 
mother in child support proceedings when he took two inconsistent positions about his obligations to the 
mother).  
165. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.  
166. See supra Section IV.  












manner.168 Therefore, it can provide criminal defendants with necessary 
protections from abuse of the judicial process and ensure that prosecutors 
are not overly burdened or limited.  
CONCLUSION 
Factually baseless pleas undermine justice. Inherently, these pleas are 
lies that our system has adopted to patch together a case-by-case attempt to 
render fair verdicts.169 While these factually baseless pleas may help 
individual defendants receive lenient sentences and may allow prosecutors 
and judges to quickly clear their caseloads, they do not provide a consistent 
and predictable criminal legal system.170 These pleas undermine the intent 
of the legislature because the crimes that the legislature defined are no 
longer being enforced.171 When a prosecutor amends a crime to a lesser-
included or related crime, the crime still has some factual basis that ensures 
the defendant is being “appropriately” punished for his or her actions.172 
However, when the defendant accepts a factually baseless plea, his or her 
punishment is only related to the crime by the prosecutor’s loose 
approximation of what justice requires.173 This is an inappropriate way to 
determine justice.  
Therefore, in order to avoid the issues presented by factually baseless 
pleas, specifically in the Double Jeopardy context, it may be best to follow 
the lead of Iowa174 and eliminate factually baseless pleas entirely. However, 
in the interim, Courts should use the doctrine of judicial estoppel to protect 
criminal defendants from prosecutorial abuse of factually baseless pleas.175 
Hopefully, judicial estoppel can provide criminal defendants protection 
 
168. Brooks v. Fletcher, 337 S.W.3d 137, 140–46 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (applying the factors 
enunciated in New Hampshire v. Maine, and also considering individualized factors such as time 
between the inconsistent statements, good faith, and the relationship of the lawsuits). 
169. See supra Section II.  
170. See supra Section II. 
171. See Byrne, supra note 9, at 2967 n.28; cf. People v. Stephenson, 30 P.3d 715 (Colo. App. 
2000). When the legislature defines the elements of the crime of littering, they intend for people who 
have littered to be punished accordingly. See id. However, when the prosecutor punishes someone under 
the littering statute for actions which constitute marijuana possession, they are re-defining the elements 
of the crime and superseding the legislature’s intent. See id.  
172. See supra Section II. 
173. See supra Section II. 
174. See Iowa Supreme Court Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 367 (Iowa 2005).  
175. See supra Section V.  











from abuses of prosecutorial power and ensure that defendants like Leigh 
do not “live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.”176  
Rob Mangone* 
 
176. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
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